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We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we 
are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up 
to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from 
doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this 
article, I probe the source and epistemic justification of our 
‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not 
lean heavily on our first-personal experience of choice and action, 
and instead regards freedom belief as a priori justified. I will then 
consider possible replies available to incompatibilists to the 
contention made by some compatibilists that the ‘privileged’ 
epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account endorses) 
supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the nature 
of freedom itself. 
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We human beings are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others 
that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up 
to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing 
one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In what follows, I will 
probe the source and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I 
propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-
personal experience of choice and action, and instead regards freedom 
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belief as a priori justified. I will then consider possible replies available to 
incompatibilists to the contention made by some compatibilists that the 
‘privileged’ epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account 
endorses) supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the 
nature of freedom itself. 
 
 
2. The Source and Justification of Our Freedom Belief 
 
I start from the large but widely-shared assumption that our belief in 
agential freedom (‘free will’) in mature human beings is somehow or other 
‘properly basic’, rationally warranted independent of any evidential 
connection to other warranted beliefs.1 My aim is merely to determine the 
most plausible account of how this is so.  
 
A common view among philosophers past and present is that our belief in 
freedom is based in an experience as of freedom that pervades deliberate 
choice and action.2 If this is correct, we may readily propose an analogy 
with beliefs that have their immediate source in sensory experience. It is 
widely held that, e.g., my sensory-based belief that I am sitting in a chair 
is non-inferentially rationally warranted, despite both its being conceivable 
that I am dreaming and the fact that my perceiving a chair as a chair 
depends causally on my having had prior experiences and conceptual 
 
1 A philosopher of a strongly empiricist bent might propose instead that our freedom belief 
is rooted in third-personal evidence of systematic connections between our antecedent 
psychological states, our choices, and our subsequent actions. But I doubt that such 
evidence is robust and specific enough for this purpose unless one endorses a deflationary 
view of the content of our freedom belief.  
In a variation on such an account, Nichols (2015, 42-49) suggests that each of us makes a 
statistical/inductive (or possibly deductive) inference from our own case in coming to think 
that our choices are causally undetermined (he does not distinguish, as I do, freedom belief 
from the belief that choices are causally undetermined). Our not being aware of determining 
causes of our decisions (in typical cases) is paired with an assumption that all causal 
influences on decisions are introspectively available, yielding the conclusion that they are 
not determined. But again it seems to me psychologically implausible that we each come 
to form and sustain such belief on broadly empirical grounds. Nichols acknowledges that 
there is no direct evidence that this is so. Instead, he claims that it provides a ‘how possible 
story’ that in the absence of any other good explanation is a plausible contender for being 
the correct story. I go on to give a different account that better meshes with the fact that 
freedom belief is widespread, if not universal, and is implicated in our moral outlook. Our 
practice of moral accountability is plausibly more deeply rooted in human psychology than 
this kind of inferential story would indicate. Nichols further claims that, if his hypothesis 
concerning the inferential origin of belief in indeterminism is correct, its rational warrant is 
undercut by scientific evidence of unconscious causal influences. On the evidential bearing 
of unconscious influences on belief in indeterminism that is not inferred in the manner 
Nichols proposes, see fn.12 below. 
2 For a recent defense of this view, see Guillon (2014, 2017). See also Holton (2009). 
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learning. Beliefs stemming directly from sensory experience (or many of 
them) are epistemically ‘innocent until proven guilty’. Likewise, it may be 
claimed, for our belief in our own freedom, grounded in an experience as 
of freedom.  
 
To assess this proposal, we need to consider the content of our experiences 
as of freedom. Psychologists have suggested that the background/focal 
distinction that is apt for describing sensory awareness also applies to 
awareness of our own agency (Wegner 2002). When I walk to campus 
along the usual route, I am often thinking about the lecture I am about to 
give. I barely attend to my stopping at the traffic light or my continuous 
action when not so stopped of moving my legs. Nonetheless, I have a 
background sense of being in control of what I am doing. 
 
It is difficult to characterize precisely this background sense of agency, 
though we’ll return to it below. What most philosophers have in mind when 
appealing to experience as grounding warranted freedom belief is not this 
background sense of agency but instead a more focal and episodic 
experience: the experience we have when consciously and more or less 
deliberately deciding what we shall do when confronted with a limited 
number of action alternatives. In such cases, it seems to me that it is in my 
power to determine the choice I am about to make – at a minimum, a power 
to do or not to do some contemplated action. 
 
It is not sufficiently appreciated that an experience-based account of the 
epistemic warrant of freedom belief must make several tacit empirical 
commitments.3 The most obvious of these is that the experience as of 
freedom is a cross-cultural universal, rather than being limited to those who 
have been reared in particular cultural ways of thinking about agency and 
responsibility. There is some evidence in support of the universality of 
freedom experience (Sarkissian et al. 2010), but it remains to be firmly 
established.  
 
A second empirical commitment is that such experience, even if universal, 
is the basis of freedom belief, rather than the other way around, and that it 
is also not substantially shaped by any other explanatorily-prior belief, 
such as a belief in moral responsibility. Against this, one might point to 
evidence that the degree of control one self-ascribes can be modulated to 
some degree by external cues (Desantis et al. 2011, cited in Bayne 2016, 
and Wegner 2002). However, such studies are limited (for feasibility 
reasons) to post-choice reports, rather than targeting real time 
 
3 See related discussion in Bayne (2016, 641-642). 
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experiencing-in-willing, and so provide direct evidence only for the 
malleability of post hoc beliefs. 
 
A third assumption that this epistemic account appears to require is that the 
experience as of freedom is appropriately causally related to the process of 
choice and action. Sensory experience is a reliable causal consequence of 
the physical reality perceived; likewise, it seems, freedom experience, if it 
is to ground the justification of freedom belief, should be reliably and fairly 
directly caused by (if it is not simply an aspect of) the formation of choice 
– the manifestation of the power seemingly experienced. Some see 
evidence to the contrary in certain abnormal clinical phenomena such as 
anarchic and alien hand syndromes, in which an individual engages in 
purposive behavior (e.g., reaching for someone else’s glass of water) while 
lacking the experience as of controlling (or even desiring) the behavior. 
The conclusion drawn is that the causal pathway of the experience as of 
freedom is quite distinct from the origin of purposive decision, and so such 
experience (when present) should not be taken to be a plausible epistemic 
basis for justified belief concerning the nature of purposive action itself. 
Note, however, that this establishes only that purposive action can occur 
without freedom experience, and we already knew that. Purposive action 
is a broader category than directly free action, encompassing the 
significant portion of our behavior that is automated, including the routine 
behavior noted above of taking a familiar route to work each day.4 Usually, 
such behavior is also accompanied by a background sense of agency, and 
that is what is missing in these clinical cases (to the agents’ considerable 
distress). But neither the diffuse background sense of agency nor the 
unconsciously generated and regulated behavior it normally accompanies 
are at issue here. The theoretical commitment of the epistemic view we are 
exploring is that deliberate conscious choices very reliably either cause or 
have as a component an experience as of freedom in so choosing. The 
unusual cases cited simply do not speak to this claim. And even if cases 
could be adduced that prise apart these elements, unless there was reason 
to suppose that they do so with some frequency, they would not provide a 
compelling basis against the epistemological position that (as with the 
counterpart position regarding sensory experience) requires only 
substantial, not perfect reliability in the connection between experience 
and its object. 
 
 
4 Libertarians regularly make this distinction (see, e.g., Clarke 2003, 63, who distinguishes 
‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ free actions). Some compatibilists will dispute this, however, 
defining freedom of will and action in purely negative terms (the absence of certain 
freedom-undermining conditions). But such austere freedom theorists are unlikely for that 
very reason to give an experience-based account of the justification of our freedom belief, 
and so we may set their views aside for present purposes. 
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A fourth and final empirical commitment of an experience-based account 
of warranted freedom belief stems from the fact that each of us has first-
personal experience only of our own agency and yet (unlike sensory 
experience) we would seem to have warranted belief in the freedom of 
others, too. This suggests the need for a two-part account on which belief 
in my own freedom is epistemically basic, while my belief in others’ 
freedom is implicitly inferred from my belief that others are relevantly 
similar to me, including in their having experience as of freedom similar 
to my own. The latter clause commits one to a substantial empirical claim 
(about the source of a belief).  
 
I do not see evidence that any of the four empirical assumptions has been 
significantly disconfirmed to date. But they are non-trivial assumptions 
that are much less evident than the corresponding assumptions we make 
regarding our own sensory experience. For this reason, it is desirable to 
have an account of the warrant of freedom belief that does not depend on 
these assumptions.  
 
Such an alternative account is ready to hand: rather than drawing an 
analogy with belief rooted in sensory experience, we may draw one with 
our foundational empirical belief in a regular causal order to physical 
reality. This is a belief that we bring to our experience and exploration of 
that reality – that serves as an unargued starting point for our investigations 
of that reality. Our belief in freedom, we may plausibly contend, is a 
starting point in our approach to social reality (cf. Strawson 1962), one 
facet of the ‘theory of mind’ that we are naturally disposed to apply when 
we attain an appropriate stage of cognitive development. Whatever its 
evolutionary origin, we are primed to see ourselves and our fellows as 
agents with a substantial measure of freedom of choice, which partly 
grounds our moral responsibility. This belief need not be grounded in an 
experience of freedom to have a privileged epistemic status, and it seems 
psychologically implausible that the belief first forms in individuals 
through inference from freedom experience. That said, this is ultimately an 
empirical question; an account on which freedom belief occurs and is 
warranted independently of freedom experience incurs an empirical 
commitment no less than account on which there is a dependence. We’ll 
be on safest grounds if we endorse the disjunction of the two, with the 
choice between them to be resolved (if it can be) on empirical grounds. 
One way to draw the two accounts closer together is to suppose that 
freedom experience is a significant part of the developmental trigger on a 
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disposition latent in our cognitive architecture towards freedom belief (in 
ourselves and others).5 
 
 
3. Justified Freedom Belief and ‘Risky’ Theories of Freedom 
 
Incompatibilists hold that the falsity of causal determinism is a necessary 
condition on our being free.6  Some compatibilists contend that only a 
successful, final physical theory with the implication of causal 
indeterminism could give us reason to believe that indeterminism obtains. 
As the jury is still out on what a final physics will imply, we ought to be 
agnostic about whether our behavior is determined. But, they go on to 
argue, since we are entitled to believe that we are free, we have reason to 
think that compatibilism is true, since its truth, unlike that of libertarianism 
(the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that we are free), is 
independent of this still-open question.7 Put another way, libertarianism 
has implications for physics and neuroscience (the science most directly 
 
5 I thank Michael Murez for helpful discussion on this point. Jean-Baptiste Guillon pointed 
out to me that the account I am suggesting leaves an epistemic gap between ‘people often 
act freely’ and ‘this action was freely performed.’ I am inclined to think that we close this 
gap in practice by noting the circumstances of the action, and in particular the experience 
of uncertainty as between alternatives. In making this suggestion, I am further 
amalgamating the two accounts. 
6 Parallel to disputes regarding the source of freedom belief, there is disagreement among 
libertarians regarding the source of their epistemic justification for believing that our 
choices are causally undetermined. Some say that this, too, is directly given in the 
experience of making deliberate choices. Most compatibilists will concede that it is not part 
of the content of our experience of making a deliberate choice that my choice is causally 
determined: there is no experience as of factors being causally sufficient for producing our 
choices. More controversial is the contention of some incompatibilists that we have the 
experience as of not being causally determined – that our agential experience has 
‘libertarian content.’ The concept of causal determinism is of course too sophisticated a 
concept to plausibly attribute it to the explicit content of universal, mature human 
experience. A more plausible claim is that the best articulation of our somewhat inchoate 
experience as of freedom entails that, if it is veridical, our choices are not causally 
determined. It is the experience as of a ‘two-way’ (or multi-way) power to settle what our 
own motivations do not, and a satisfaction condition on the reality of such power is that our 
choices are not causally determined. I myself regard this claim as plausible, but it is 
controversial and difficult to adjudicate. Other libertarians would say instead that the belief 
that freedom requires causal indeterminism is justified solely through theoretical inference 
from, e.g., some version of the Consequence Argument. (Defenders of the former position 
might connect the two by maintaining that debate over the soundness of the Consequence 
Argument for incompatibilism as at root a dispute regarding the content of our own 
experience of freedom in action.) It is not my purpose to argue a position on this matter 
here. 
7  “One of the main virtues of compatibilism is that [its] most basic views about our 
agency—our freedom and moral responsibility—are not held hostage to views in physics” 
Fischer (2007, 81). 
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germane to the etiology of human action). But we have no business 
believing in advance of the science that the best final theories in these 
domains will have nondeterministic dynamics.  
 
I will now consider three replies that libertarians have made to this 
argument and then propose and endorse a fourth. 
  
1st response: compatibilism has scientifically risky commitments, too 
 
Libertarian accounts of (direct) freedom differ, but they often have the 
form of endorsing many conditions commonly recognized by 
compatibilists and then adding at minimum a condition of significant 
causal indeterminism. Therefore, let us concede that compatibilist accounts 
of freedom require less than libertarian accounts. (In reality, this issue is 
slightly clouded by the fact that some compatibilist accounts impose 
conditions rejected by others. A given libertarian account may build upon 
one of the less stringent compatibilist accounts, and so not require a 
condition imposed by another compatibilist account, and not all 
compatibilist conditions are obviously met by all free human persons – 
Frankfurt’s (1971) hierarchical account comes to mind.) The first response 
contends that it is not only distinctively incompatibilist conditions on 
freedom that seem potentially falsifiable by future science. In fact, recent 
studies in cognitive and social psychology have been claimed to show that 
human agents are badly ill-informed about their own motivations for acting 
as they do and, furthermore, that their experience as of consciously willing 
to act as they do is neither an aspect of nor caused by the actual, 
unconscious processes that generate their behavior. 8  Admittedly, the 
arguments made from such studies are overblown,9  but (says the first 
respondent) the very fact that competent and knowledgeable theorists wish 
to debate these claims shows that they are not scientifically innocent. 
Libertarians may be “hostage to” views in future physics, but insofar as 
(many) compatibilists endorse conditions on freedom that these recent 
contentions have put on the menu for scientific study of human action, they 
are hostage to views in psychology. 
 
However, I think the compatibilist has a reply here that is not available to 
the libertarian. For it is hard to see how science could consistently deny the 
efficacy of our conscious wills as a general matter. Scientific theories, 
models, and results are themselves the products of scientific activity: of 
human persons acting in certain coordinated, purposive ways and 
communicating their activities and results to one another. While the reality 
 
8 For an engaging, if slightly dated overview of many such studies, see Wegner (2002). 
9 See O’Connor (2009) and Mele (2009). 
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of reliably-known, purposive action may not be an explicit premise, or part 
of the theoretical content, of scientific theories, it is a pragmatic 
assumption of such science: if we supposed it to be false, we would thereby 
have reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the outputs of such activity. It 
is reasonable to accept the trustworthiness of these outputs only insofar as 
we take them to have resulted from actions guided by the specific 
conscious purposes and beliefs that the actors’ report them to have been. 
To deny the efficacy of conscious will is to saw off the branch on which 
one sits. One certainly may argue unproblematically that human action and 
self-awareness are prone to error and ignorance in a variety of specific 
forms. Our grasp of our own motivations is imperfect, we are sometimes 
self-deceived, and it is not always easy to come to a more accurate self-
understanding even when we learn of the flaws in our cognitive design. 
‘Willusionism’,10 by contrast, is inherently unstable because of its sweeping 
generality, as it thereby encompasses the very activity of the would-be 
unmaskers of human agency. (This simple point is not sufficiently 
appreciated by some ‘no free will’ scientists who precisely target at times 
the assumption of conscious efficacious agency, which they do not clearly 
distinguish from freedom as libertarians understand it.) This is, if you like, 
a transcendental argument for effective conscious agency, but not for 
libertarian freedom. 
 
A libertarian might contend that scientific practice presupposes 
indeterminism also, in the form of real alternatives open to the scientific 
investigator in experimentally probing and manipulating natural processes. 
Scientific experimental interventions are deliberate attempts to impose a 
departure from the natural, law-governed unfolding of events, suppressing 
some natural dispositions and artificially stimulating others in an effort to 
isolate and characterize causal variables not previously understood. But it 
is far from clear that this conception of experimental interventions entails 
a departure from fundamental, deterministic regularities. They may, rather, 
belong to a special kind of macroscopic process that is determined to occur 
in accordance with psychophysical law – one part of Nature causally 
determined to query the whole, not producing events that depart from what 
Nature as a whole was bound to do, but rather events that depart from the 
kind that would have occurred in the absence of such intervening systems 





10  An apt term coined by Eddy Nahmias (2011) for the view that the experience of 
efficacious conscious willing is a pervasive illusion. 
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2nd response: the limits of conclusive confirmation of deterministic 
theories  
 
The first response to the compatibilist’s challenge that the libertarian’s 
fortunes are implausibly hostage to future physics was to contend that a 
similar challenge is faced by most varieties of compatibilism. A second 
response is to argue that neither view faces such a challenge, as it is a paper 
tiger. There is no threat because there are inherent limits to what science 
can establish when it comes to anything as complex as human agency. 
Dynamical theories about elementary phenomena (such as quantum 
mechanics) draw most of their evidence from studying the behavior of 
small systems in artificially isolated contexts, near vacua where external 
influence is screened off. But libertarians do not (typically) accept the 
reductionist premise that human beings and their behavior are simply the 
resultant of trillions of micro-interactions of their simplest parts and those 
of their surrounding environment. They (and some compatibilists) will 
suppose that freely made choices in particular are strongly emergent 
phenomena, where this entails a kind of ‘top down’ control of certain 
highly organized systems over their own behavior. This strong emergentist 
thesis is not disconfirmed by the successes of particle physics in accurately 
and fully describing the behavior of matter in simple, non-organized 
contexts.  
 
This reply is, I believe, cogent as far as it goes: the question of whether 
human choice is fully causally determined will not be settled by the 
character of an ex hypothesi ‘final’ physical theory. However, there is a 
better candidate science for (eventually) giving significant evidence in 
favor of the determinist option on the question, and that is neuroscience, 
assisted by more functionalist branches of cognitive psychology. The 
challenges it faces in the attempt to settle this question are not trivial: there 
are 80-100 billion neurons in the mature human brain, with many hundreds 
of millions likely involved in regions directly impinging on human choice 
dynamics. There is the open question of indeterministic quantum effects 
bubbling up from below to be grappled with, as well as getting a theoretical 
grip on what plausible and detailed emergentist hypotheses might look 
like. And, independent of these complications, we are a long ways off from 
having any kind of testable and detailed theoretical hypothesis concerning 
the neural process underlying human deliberation and choice, which may 
well be subject to significant individual variability. All that acknowledged, 
one can imagine a feasible development of the science to the point that 
regions of the brain of a deliberating person could be monitored in real 
time with sufficient fineness of grain to yield psychological correlates of 
measurable strength that enable testable predictions of behavior in 
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paradigm ostensible instance of free choice. 11  Doubtless such studies 
would require approximating techniques and less-than-certain assumptions 
that could be disputed. But no one has offered a compelling reason to think 
that it will be infeasible indefinitely for the science to advance to the point 
where significant evidence that human deliberation approximates a 
deterministic process might be adduced. 12  I conclude that our second 
possible response, too, is unsatisfactory.13 
 
3rd response: hedging one’s bets on incompatibilism 
 
Peter van Inwagen (1983, 219-221) reports that his various a priori 
commitments in the matter of free will and moral responsibility are of 
variable strength. In particular, his confidence in we are morally 
responsible creatures is greater than it is in we have free will which is 
greater in turn than it is in incompatibilism is true and some of our acts are 
causally undetermined. This leads him to suggest that, if determinism were 
empirically established, he would abandon his incompatibilism, leaving 
intact his other, stronger commitments. In reply to the compatibilist charge 
that his incompatibilism renders his beliefs concerning moral 
responsibility and freedom “hostage to” physics, he in effect says that only 
his incompatibilism is so hostage, not his commitment to the reality of 
responsibility and freedom. 
 
Let us consider van Inwagen’s stance more carefully, in order to determine 
whether it is one that libertarians generally might plausibly endorse. Van 
Inwagen contends that his strength of belief in the following propositions 
are ordered (stronger to weaker) as numbered. (His belief in (3) and (3a), 
 
11  I leave aside discussion of Benjamin Libet’s (1985) notorious conclusion from his 
famous study, since refined by many others right up the present day. The shortcomings of 
extant studies of this kind for addressing our present question have been made clear by 
many philosophers (e.g., Mele 2009), and recent scientific work has called into question 
precisely what kind of neural process Libet studies are tracking (beginning with Schurger 
et al., 2012). 
12 Terry Horgan (2015) and Tim Bayne (2016, 641-2) mistakenly claim that there is ample 
evidence against libertarianism already, in that cognitive science indicates myriad 
unconscious influences on human choice. But this is a very weak argument, since 
libertarians do not, as a rule, deny that we are subject to such causal influences. They are 
committed to denying only that such factors collectively determine all our choices. 
13 It is open to the proponent of the second reply to argue that our a priori justification for 
believing in the conjunction of incompatibilism and the belief that we are free is sufficiently 
strong that it would necessarily outweigh such an inference to the best explanation in favor 
of determinism based on somewhat indirect evidence. But even such a contention would 
need to concede that strong but defeasible evidence for determinism would require us to 
weaken our confidence in our belief in freedom. Further discussion of this general point 
occurs in my discussion of the third reply, immediately following in the text. 
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and (4) and (4a), are equally strong, with the ‘a’ propositions being a direct 
consequence of the similarly numbered propositions and one above it.14): 
 
(1) We are sometimes morally responsible for the consequences of 
our acts;  
(2) The validity of Beta entails that our having free will entails 
indeterminism; 
[Beta is the key ‘transfer’ of inability principle in his argument for 
incompatibilism. So van Inwagen is saying that Alpha and the 
other, ‘fixity’ premises are more certain than Beta, which comes 
in at (4).] 
(3) If (1) is true, then we have free will; 
[‘Free will’ for van Inwagen is having the ability to act other than 
what one does; this proposition is the Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities.] 
(3a) We have free will;  
(4) Beta is valid;15 
(4a) Our having free will entails indeterminism; 
[The thesis of Incompatibilism] 
(5) Indeterminism is true. (219) 
 
Although he ‘prefers’ the propositions in this order, van Inwagen regards 
the conjunction of them as ‘very likely’ and so each of the conjuncts as 
very likely. He thus thinks it very likely that indeterminism is true in 
particular. But he goes on to say that if he were persuaded that science gave 
him an indisputable reason to accept determinism, he would reject Beta (4) 
and Incompatibilism (4a), since the (ex hypothesi) false (5) follows from 
(3a) and (4a), and he prefers (3a) to (4a), and (4a) itself follows from (2) 
and (4), and he prefers (2) to (4). So, the equally likely and linked (4) and 
(4a) would both have to go. He adds, crucially, “[a]nd that would seem to 
be the end of the matter” (221). 
 
In conversation, some philosophers have expressed puzzlement at van 
Inwagen’s conditional response to learning the truth of determinism, on the 
 
14 By this same reason, van Inwagen should have labeled (5) as “(4b).” I query this reason 
below. 
15 Van Inwagen has come to accept that Beta is invalid, but he now accepts a successor 
principle that functions much the same in the argument for incompatibilism. 
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grounds that the denial of (5) is a straightforwardly empirical claim, and 
that should not be the primary grounds for abandoning a purely conceptual 
claim such as (4), which is necessarily true, if true at all.16 (1) and (3), as 
other empirical claims, are better candidates for being disconfirmed by the 
falsity of (5). But the general constraint on evidential support does not 
seem correct, as is shown by the following simple example17: I reason from 
purely mathematical principles, some uncontroversial and others less so, 
that Fermat’s Last Theorem is false, and I am confident but less than 
maximally certain of my reasoning. Then my trustworthy friend Andrew 
the esteemed mathematician tells me that the theorem is true (and nothing 
more). It seems that I can reasonably be led on this empirical basis (simple 
testimony) to abandon the conjunction of the less-certain propositions. 
 
A significant point of disanalogy is that in the mathematical case, my 
conclusion is derived from only putatively necessary premises, whereas in 
van Inwagen’s case it is a mixture of an empirical claim and modal claims. 
 
16 Fischer (2016, 48) initially frames his ‘problem of metaphysical flip-flopping’ this way 
(“the rejection of an a priori ingredient in the incompatibilist’s argument, contingent upon 
learning that causal determinism is true,” 48), but he develops his criticism of van 
Inwagen’s stance in different terms. His first considered criticism is that causal determinism 
is ‘evidentially unrelated’ to the crucial principle 4 (Beta), and so learning the former ought 
not to affect his commitment to the latter (54). This is uncompelling. Learning something 
may reveal to us that at least one of a small set of beliefs must be false, without making 
clear which. Fischer goes on to object to van Inwagen’s preference ordering for the reality 
of moral responsibility over the principles that are needed to infer indeterminism. While I, 
too, find this ranking somewhat unnatural, it’s hard to make a case that such a preference 
is irrational. Further below in the text, I note that the controversial status of the principles 
may well lead one to be less than maximally confident in them. I go on to suggest that the 
real problem with van Inwagen’s stance is his apparent commitment to the unrevisability 
of his belief in moral responsibility. Fischer expresses something similar in maintaining 
that van Inwagen should be open to the option of moral-responsibility skepticism, but that 
is different - and an odd complaint from one who endorses the objection to incompatibilism 
that set the stage for our consideration of van Inwagen’s response! The way out that goes 
overlooked by van Inwagen and (here, at least) by Fischer is the option of being open to a 
form of revisionism when it comes to moral practice, which I develop near the end of the 
paper.  
17 I find van Inwagen’s own reason for rejecting it unconvincing: “I have defended (Beta) 
entirely on a priori grounds. But it would not surprise me too much to find that this 
proposition, which at present seems to me to be a truth of reason, had been refuted by the 
progress of science. Such refutations have happened many times” (221). Presumably he is 
alluding to examples such as the rejection of Euclidean geometry by the Theory of General 
Relativity, or the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and Quantum Mechanics. A more 
accurate interpretation of this history, it seems to me, is that purely conceptual 
developments enabled thinkers to see possibilities hitherto unimagined (the separability of 
the particular parallel postulate from the other axioms of Euclidean geometry and their 
consistency with alternatives; the coherence of irreducibly statistical forms of explanation, 
allowing for a formally weaker but no less universal regulative explanatory principle than 
PSR), and this conceptual space was then exploited by empirical theorists. But nothing in 
the text hangs on my disagreement with van Inwagen on this point. 
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Might we suppose that in the latter kind of case, empirical evidence ought 
to lead to revision only of empirical claims in the former basis for the 
disconfirmed proposition? But doing so would seem to require setting 
aside van Inwagen’s believing the empirical claim (we are morally 
responsible) more strongly than the putative truths of reason.  
 
To take things further, let us consider another couple analogous cases: 
 
BIV: (1) This is a hand; (2) this is a hand entails I am not a brain 
in a vat; so (3) I am not a brain in a vat.  I learn that (3) is false. 
Martian: (1) We are sometimes morally responsible for the 
consequences of our acts; (2) if (1), then our acts are not all a more-
or-less direct product of remote Martian manipulation via secret 
micro-chip brain implants; so, (3) our acts are not all a more-or-
less direct product of remote Martian manipulation via secret 
micro-chip brain implants. I learn that (3) is false. 
 
Suppose that, for each of the cases, a philosopher believes proposition (1) 
more strongly than she believes proposition (2), although she judges each 
of them to be very likely true. And she further believes that were she to 
learn not-(3), she should reject (2) and retain (1). This would not be a 
mystifying stance – it could be held on the basis of a not-crazy theory about 
the role of reference in determining meaning – but I would regard it as 
implausible nonetheless. 18  In the imagined, extreme circumstances, it 
seems more reasonable for me to abandon (1) rather than the conditional 
expressing one of (1)’s evident implications. And so, I expect, would 
nearly everyone judge. (Van Inwagen himself uses the Martian example 
against the ‘Paradigm Case’ defense of compatibilism.) That indicates, 
though, that, with respect to each case, I believe (2) more strongly than (1). 
One question, then, is whether van Inwagen can reasonably hold a different 
preference ordering in the original case, believing in moral responsibility 
more strongly than he does in the conditionals expressing its putative 
theoretical implications (PAP, Beta and Incompatibilism). Note that in this 
case, there is nothing approaching universal agreement on those alleged 
implications, unlike (perhaps) the counterparts in BIV and Martian. 
Convinced but reflective incompatibilists such as van Inwagen might take 
this sociological difference to reflect a difference in ‘closeness’ of the 
theoretical commitments to the pre-theoretical concept of moral 
 
18 See Heller (1996) for just such a response to the Martian case. Deery (2019, msp. 11-13) 
shows how one can embrace a more nuanced causal-historical theory of reference for the 
concept of free action without concluding that we are free if the Martian control scenario 
were actually the case. 
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responsibility (and freedom). Further, as on most questions of degree, 
incompatibilists will differ in their precise judgments in these matters, with 
some seeing a tighter connection than others. 
 
So far, we have not seen a convincing reason to regard van Inwagen’s 
stance as an unreasonable one. However, even if van Inwagen reasonably 
assigns credences as he indicates, it does not follow that his method for 
handling evidence conflicting with a strongly held belief is correct. There 
are options beyond continuing to believe or coming to reject beliefs that 
underlie one’s disconfirmed beliefs, so merely identifying and repudiating 
the least strongly held such belief(s) that enable one to avoid outright 
contradiction at minimal cost would not “seem to be the end of the matter.” 
A more fine-grained response looks for probabilistic evidential 
connections. ~(5) may not entail ~(3) or ~(1), but perhaps one with van 
Inwagen’s commitments should judge that (3) or (1), or both, are less likely 
on ~(5) than they are on current evidence (which does not include ~(5)). 
Remember that we are considering a credence set (van Inwagen’s) that 
regards all of (1)-(5) as ‘very likely.’ (Van Inwagen is a fully convinced, 
not half-hearted, libertarian.) If he comes to believe in determinism, he 
cannot rationally continue to affirm the conjunction of (1)-(4). But since 
his preference for (1) over (2), (3), or (4) is slight, and scientific evidence 
for determinism does not speak directly to any of them, it seems that the 
most reasonable belief revision is to downgrade his credence in all of them 
to some extent: he knows that at least one of them must be false, but he has 
no firm basis for singling out a particular one of them. Perhaps his 
continuing to believe (1) (which he antecedently believed most strongly of 
the four) can survive this revision, but it will be a less strongly held belief. 
 
There may be a reason that van Inwagen doesn’t consider this seemingly 
judicious stance. Note that van Inwagen regards (3) and (3a) as equally 
likely, and similarly for (4) and (4a). He says that he so regards these pairs 
of propositions because (3a) follows directly from (1) and (3), and (4a) 
follows directly from (2) and (4). But a logical implication of a pair of 
propositions should not be treated as equally likely as either of the 
individual propositions unless one regards the other of the pair as certain. 
To put it in probabilistic terms, just to make the point salient, if one assigns 
(A) a probability of .9 and a wholly independent proposition (B) a 
probability of .8, and A & B entail a distinct proposition C, which one 
believes solely on the basis of A&B, then one should add the chances of 
A’s being false and of B’s being false, and so conclude that C should be 
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assigned a probability of .7.19 Van Inwagen’s reported strength of beliefs 
(given their bases) are coherent only if he assigns probability 1 (or 
something very nearly it) to propositions (1) and (2), the ‘more likely’ 
propositions in the deductions of (3a) and (4a). Perhaps, then, van Inwagen 
treats (1) (the proposition that we are morally responsible) as a controlling 
proposition, something that we should hang onto, come what may – at least 
for all non-fantastical scenarios, such as the Martian case. The trouble with 
this stance is that it comes at the price that we must completely sever our 
commitment to moral responsibility from our commitment to any 
substantial claims regarding its empirical implications. And this simply 
does not sit comfortably alongside incompatibilist commitments. (As we 
saw above in considering the first response, it does not sit easily even with 
many varieties of compatibilism, although their empirical ‘exposure’ is 
more limited.) 
 
4th response: belief in free will and moral responsibility is defeasibly a 
priori justified 
 
A better response, I believe, pushes back more firmly against a central 
premise underlying the compatibilist’s challenge, which earlier I expressed 
thus: “we have no business believing in advance of the science that the best 
final theories in [physics and neuroscience] will have nondeterministic 
dynamics.” We are rationally entitled to many assumptions concerning 
ourselves and the causal character of reality in advance of scientific 
confirmation, starting with the reliability of the senses and memory and the 
regularity of the world’s fundamental causal order. Nor is it clearly 
inconceivable that some of these rational and necessary assumptions might 
be falsified by future rational investigation. It seems conceivable, e.g., that 
the deep regularities of our world suddenly cease to obtain, being replaced 
by a quite different set of regularities, such that we come to realize that the 
world is partitioned into distinct aeons, individuated by distinct natural 
laws. (Our bodies depend on biological regularities, so it is challenging to 
see how we might survive across the transitional juncture. But it remains 
conceivable in 2019 that our bodies are not essential to us.) Certain of our 
beliefs that are justified a priori thus seem to be empirically defeasible. If 
we categorize our belief in freedom and responsibility in this way, we need 
not adopt the stance of proscribing future deterministic psychological 
theories. Instead, we are simply betting against them, while letting the 
chips fall where they may.  
 
19 Where one’s confidence in C is not solely a consequence of one’s confidence in A and B 
(and, as in the example, C is not equivalent to the conjunction of A and B) then probabilistic 
coherence requires only that one assign C a value between 0.7 and 1.0. (I thank Tim 
McGrew for pointing out an error I made on this score in a previous draft.) 
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If the combination of confident belief with allowing for only the barest 
possibility of its falsity seems improperly prejudicial, inimical to 
unfettered inquiry, one should be mindful of the piecemeal advance of 
science, especially in so complex a domain as human psychology. It is hard 
if not impossible to say which open lines of inquiry in psychology and 
neuroscience (if any) have the potential to lead to eventual significant 
disconfirmation of an incompatibilist conception. Major pieces remain to 
be put into place in our understanding of human psychology before such a 
big picture question will come squarely into view of mature science. And 
even if some lines of inquiry seem friendlier to our moral self-conception 
than others, we may be further mindful of William James’ point more than 
a century ago that science is often helped, not hindered, by scientists 
having passionate commitment to competing perspectives that they seek to 
vindicate through rival research programs. 
 
What, then, should we say concerning the hypothetical future scenario in 
which we come to believe that human behavior generally is, after all, 
psychologically determined? That the proper response would be to say, ‘I 
guess we were wrong about all that’ and to abandon moral practice 
altogether? I think not. This austere disavowal is not the sole alternative to 
van Inwagen’s willingness to abandon his incompatibilism. There is a 
more attractive and fully reasonable stance for an incompatibilist that is in 
the spirit of van Inwagen’s tenacity of commitment to moral responsibility. 
It is something like Manuel Vargas’s (2007; 2013; see also Nichols 2015) 
revisionism – here taken as a hypothetical response to being given 
compelling evidence for determinism, rather than (as with Vargas) a 
current position. What precise shape a revisionist stance might take is a 
complicated question, one that needn’t be adjudicated here to motivate the 
general stance. The basic idea is that, given evidence that our previous 
moral conception of human agency is unlikely or untenable while 
recognizing the centrality of moral thought and action to our practical lives, 
we might come to think differently (whether by choice or not) about what 
our commitment to freedom and moral responsibility should amount to, 
until a changed perspective begins to take hold and wholly supplants the 
previous way of thinking. There are our current associated concepts of 
freedom and moral responsibility, with their substantial empirical 
commitments, and there is a more general (and seemingly ineliminable) 
role that moral discourse plays in our practice. If push came to shove, that 
latter role could continue to be filled by retreating to the use of more 
modest, revised concepts that result from eliminating untenable elements 
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of the original concepts.20 I do not say that the process of embracing such 
a revision would be a smooth one. Indeed, I think it would be deeply 
disconcerting to come to think that we are not free and responsible as we 
now understand those terms. But adjustment is merely difficult, whereas 
abandonment of practice seems psychologically impossible. Being 
disposed to go revisionist in the face of possible future empirical evidence 
against our current freedom and responsibility beliefs would allow one to 
agree with van Inwagen on the incompatibilist implications of our ordinary 
concepts, and to agree with him and many compatibilists on the practical 
‘unthinkability’ of abandoning the practice of judging ourselves to exercise 
freedom in many of our actions and holding one another morally 
responsible for the consequences of such acts (in some recognizable sense), 
while also and more reasonably allowing that beliefs that have substantial 
empirical commitments should be disconfirmable. And once we recognize 
the availability and attractiveness of this more nuanced attitude regarding 
worst-case scenarios, we can fully meet the compatibilist’s challenge. 
 
I have proposed that our belief in our own freedom is epistemically 
warranted a priori while being defeasible. Whether it is grounded in 
regular experience as of acting freely is an open empirical question, but I 
am inclined to doubt it. (The thought that it needs to be so grounded in 
order to be rationally warranted is an empiricist prejudice that should be 
resisted.) I close by briefly responding to a skeptical query: if belief in our 
own freedom is instinctive and warranted a priori, whence occasional 
disbelief in free will among the intelligentsia? The natural answer is that 
this is a species of theoretical skeptical doubt, similar to skeptical doubts 
regarding, e.g., the reality of causation, another proposition that we are 
warranted a priori in accepting. In both cases, the theoretical doubt is 
matched by practical commitment to the thesis, expressed in behavior. This 
may involve the person’s having contradictory beliefs. But another 
 
20 This of course assumes that not all elements of our freedom and responsibility concepts 
are essential to them. Fortunately, we need not resolve that question here. If this assumption 
is false, the revisionist proposal may take the form of replacing the original concepts with 
successor concepts that overlap the originals and that can still fill the broad role in moral 
practice that we cannot imagine abandoning altogether. For a map to possible forms that 
revision or replacement might take, see Nichols (2015, 59-62).  
Deery (2019) proposes, alternatively, that free action is a natural kind concept and that we 
follow Boyd’s (1999) analysis of such concepts as homeostatic property clusters, where not 
all properties in the cluster are essential to them, and where the applicability of the concept 
is consistent with our making significant false presuppositions concerning it. If it is widely 
and wrongly assumed that the properties we track with our freedom concept involve or 
require causal indeterminism (something Deery does not commit himself to), it would still 
refer. I doubt that this is the correct way to think about our freedom concept, and doubt 
more strongly that indeterminism is merely an implicit associated assumption concerning 




possibility, and one that I find attractive, is that the person believes the 
target proposition while merely believing that he disbelieves (or fails to 
believe) it. That is, the theoretical doubt takes the form of a (mistaken) 
belief concerning one of the person’s own first-order beliefs.  
 
Either way, an advantage of the alternative, conditional revisionism 
suggested in the previous paragraph is that it would allow for continued 
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